Although more and more signals indicate that the conflict is ending, and traffic through the strait has begun to return to pre‑conflict levels, the negative effects on the global economy are already visible. Rising energy, transport and insurance costs have weakened corporate activity, worsened trade conditions and reignited inflationary pressure.
The OECD forecasts that global GDP growth in 2026 will slow to 2.8%, down from 2.9% in the previous edition and 3.4% in 2025.
In the euro area the slowdown will be even greater. GDP in 2026 is expected to grow only 0.8% versus 1.4% in 2025. Trade in Europe is projected to grow more than twice as weakly as in 2025. At the same time, inflation in G20 countries is expected to be 4.0% in 2026 versus 3.4% in 2025.
Poland is coping with the crisis better than its neighbours
Against the backdrop of a weakening global economy, Poland surprises with resilience. The main shock effect is higher PPI and CPI inflation rates. In real terms the effects are visible only in industries directly linked to commodities transported through the Strait of Hormuz. Conjuncture data (on the next page) indicate a deterioration in oil refining and chemical production sentiment.
Transport problems also arise, as it heavily depends on fuel prices. Higher inflation mainly hits consumers, who in conditions of greater uncertainty partially curb their purchases. This is reflected in lower retail sales growth.
Consumer demand has been partially shielded by the CPN program, which at relatively low cost limited the risk of rising inflation expectations and the activation of feedback loops that would make supply‑shock effects much more painful. Despite the shock already being in its fourth month, more and more firms in the business‑sentiment survey signal increased production, demand recovery and improved financial conditions.
The data also show that commodity buyers were looking for new suppliers. Although for energy commodities the “Armington elasticity”, i.e. the possibility of replacing imports with domestic production, is low, domestic mining production has risen significantly since February, mitigating the shortages that emerged.
Short‑term support for firms also came from the weakening of the zloty, which improved the price competitiveness of domestic suppliers, although this effect has limits. The main channel of the war’s negative impact on the domestic economy is weaker activity of trade partners.
Poland’s economy is “bullet‑proof” against external shocks
This picture is confirmed by real‑sector data. Our estimates of monthly GDP indicate that growth in 2q26 was at a similar level to 1q26.
This reinforces the thesis that the Polish economy remains, so far, “bullet‑proof”, although a full assessment of the shock’s impact will only be possible in a few quarters.
Some effects may appear with a delay, but for now domestic activity remains stable and the economy effectively absorbs the external shock.
US‑Iran Agreement and the Opening of the Strait of Hormuz
In the baseline scenario we assume that the US and Iran will reach at least a partial agreement within a 60‑day negotiation period, and that the Strait of Hormuz will continue to open gradually. The risk around this assumption is high, however. The first opening of the strait proved to be temporary, and the route was closed again. Moreover, the OIES report indicates that the mere “opening” of Hormuz does not mean a quick return of the oil market to normal. Even after de‑escalation, logistical bottlenecks, higher freight and insurance costs, uneven restart of production and tensions in the oil product market will persist.
Flows through Hormuz are expected to return to more than 95% of pre‑crisis levels by 4q26 at the earliest. According to the IEA, global oil demand in 2026 versus 2025 will fall by 1.1 million bbl/d, and supply by 3.9 million bbl/d, to 102.4 million bbl/d. In 2027 the market could again enter a surplus, with supply rising by 8 million bbl/d and demand by 2 million bbl/d.
Brent price has already fallen from over 120 USD/bbl at its peak to below 80 USD/bbl, and we assume the further path in line with futures contracts. Our scenario therefore remains directionally consistent with the previous Quarterly Review: the conflict ends, oil prices gradually fall, but uncertainty remains high. At the same time the oil price trajectory is even slightly lower than we had assumed in March.
